Consequences: A Joint Liaison Committee was set up to pursue the implementation of the agreement. It held meetings in May, June and August but apparently did not survive long after the Sadiq/Garang talks of July.

Consequences: Sadiq said that the meeting had revitalised the peace process (suggesting that it would lead to further actions) but was frustrated by the SPLM/A's downing of a civilian airliner near Malakal on 16/8/86. On 21/8/86 Sadiq did announce that the September 1983 laws would be replaced when another set of laws was ready.
 
 

Consequences: The meeting probably led to the Quest for Peace meetings supported by the Sudan Council of Churches the following year.
 
 

Comment: The policy and actions of GOS since the 1989 coup correspond to the outlines of the NIF Sudan Charter. However, the federal system adopted since 1992 is still far from producing balanced regional development or providing the regions with as much autonomy as the Southern Region enjoyed under the AAA.
 
 

Consequences: The meeting was significant in: establishing a principle of solidarity between the SPLM/A and Southerners in GOS areas; keeping alive the Koka Dam agenda; and marking the reconciliation that had taken place between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya 2.
 
 

Facilitators: Government of Uganda (host); probably SCC (making contacts and helping to organise)

Agreements: Applaud the constructive line taken by President Museveni, deplore GOS policy of military confrontation, affirm support for Koka Dam, and the principle of continuing dialogue.

Consequences: The meeting was significant in: confirming the support of the Ugandan President behind the broad stance of the SPLM/A and the Southern opposition in GOS areas.
 
 

Facilitators: Government of Kenya (allowing meeting in Kenya); SCC (making contacts and helping to organise)

Agreements: Applaud Kenya’s concern for peace, appeal to international community to put pressure for peace on GOS; appeal for humanitarian relief in the South, and the minimization of hostile attitudes.

Consequences: The meeting was significant in: confirming Kenya’s recognition of the SPLM/A and Southern opinion in Sudan.
 
 

Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (allowing meeting in Ethiopia)

Agreements: The National Constitutional Conference to be held before the end of 1988. Appeal for preliminary meeting in the spirit of the 1985 uprising and the Koka Dam Agreement.

Consequences:
 
 

Content: Historical account of the background to conflict and peace initiatives; proposal for immediate meeting to discuss cease-fire, humanitarian relief and arrangements for the National Constitutional Conference (but ignoring most of the preconditions agreed at Koka Dam); draft agenda for NCC (leaving out some of the points agreed at Koka Dam, such as "basic human rights" and "natural resources"); outline of transitional arrangements including amnesty and reconstruction.

Comments: The paper’s failure to address the problems remaining from the Koka Dam declaration suggest that its purpose was not as a serious proposal to the SPLM/A. It was probably an attempt to avoid losing the initiative in the face of the (similarly-named) DUP-SPLM/A negotiations (see next entry).
 
 

Negotiators: SPLM/A (John Garang, Lam Akol and others), DUP (Mohamed Osman El-Mirghani, Sid Ahmed El-Hussein and others)

Facilitators: Government of Egypt (facilitating contacts), Government of Ethiopia (venue for meeting)

Agreements: National Constitutional Conference to be held by 31/12/88, preceded by: freezing of "Hodoud" [Shari’a punishment] provisions in September 1983 laws; abrogation of Sudan's military pacts; lifting of state of emergency; cease-fire; formation of national preparatory committee.

Comments: The substance of the agreement was similar to that of Koka Dam, which DUP had not signed but repudiated. It was presented as a new initiative. From Koka Dam, the SPLM made a concession in not demanding repeal of the September 1983 laws, but only a freezing of the huduud punishments.
 
 

Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (use of Ethiopia as venue), the proposal for the workshop came from non-sectarian intellectuals in Sudan; the SPLM/A organised it

Agreements: (Unsigned shared diagnosis of Sudan's problems): The principle of citizenship can be the only basis of national identity; Arabic is the shared language; equality for women; an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist foreign policy; a radical abandonment of the capitalist system, by revolutionary means.

Context: Participants from government-held Sudan were detained for questioning by the security services on their return.

Comment: The Ambo Workshop came at a time when a popular movement for peace seemed to be emerging in opposition to the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, following the November Accords. It served to increase the political tension. It may be seen as an attempt to construct a coalition behind a radical socialist – even revolutionary - agenda. Perhaps in retrospect this was tactically naïve. It may have played a part in winning support for the Islamist coup later in the year. The workshop’s final statement is interesting in addressing questions of economic policy which are often glossed over in the mainstream peace process.
 
 

Agreements: Food should not be used as a weapon; parties should co-operate with humanitarian efforts; political forces should co-operate for convening the National Constitutional Conference, including the institution of a cease-fire; the Forum should re-convene.

Comments: Apparently the Forum did not re-convene. It contributed some thoughtful analysis and shared understanding to the lively peace process of early 1989.
 
 

Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (Meeting was held in Ethiopia), Government of Egypt (facilitated the contacts to arrange the meeting)

Agreements: GOS and SPLM/A agreed to maintain direct communications through their respective offices in Addis Ababa, and to allow relief to go ahead through OLS.

Content: GOS proposeed an immediate National Dialogue Conference in Khartoum, attended by representatives of GOS, SPLM/A, as well as other national figures and, possibly, some foreigners. The conference resolutions could be put to a referendum. The SPLM/A delegation felt unable to accept this proposal without more specific agreements about the nature and rules of the conference. Instead it said that the long-proposed National Constitutional Conference should be held after the formation of a new government and army of national unity.

Context: A "National Salvation Revolution" (NSR) government had come to power through a military coup, which appeared timed to put a stop to the accelerating peace process based on the Koka Dam Declaration. On taking power it had offered an amnesty to the rebels, and declared ceasefires.

Comments: The conference laid the foundation for its "Peace from Within" process of the NSR government. The SPLM/A was apparently invited to attend (see Addis Ababa Talks, above) but did not do so. "Peace from Within" therefore went ahead without engaging the main opposing combatants.

Facilitators: Government of Egypt (in that the NDA began by basing itself in Cairo, which is where the SPLM/A signed the Charter in March 1990)

Agreements: The immediate tasks of opposition to the NSR government including "a general political strike, civil disobedience and well protected popular insurrection"; tasks for a transitional period after overthrowing the government, including guarantees of human rights, repeal of Islamist laws; and the form of a transitional government, combining armed forces, trades unions and political parties.

Comments: Work on contstructing a National Democratic Alliance began before the coup of June 1989; the phrase is mentioned in the SPLM/A’s paper of February 1989, ‘On the New Sudan’. The Ambo workshop, which was held in the same month, described itself as comprised of the "National Democratic Forces".

References: Salah Hassan (1993) for historical background and text of the charter. The Charter is also described in Warburg (1992).
 
 

Process: Carter held meetings with both sides to agree on the time and venue. The SPLM refused to accept his services as mediator. Most of the talks were chaired in turn by the leaders of the opposing delegations. Carter proposed a particular compromise – GOS to stop the use of Islamic Law in courts until a decision of the Constitutional Conference, if the SPLM/A dropped its insistence that GOS specifically abrogate its military pacts with Egypt and Libya – the GOS delegation said it did not have authority to make such a deal.

Analysis: The above points of agreement did not mark a big advance, as they left too many questions unanswered to lead to practical action. Carter felt that neither side was sufficiently interested in peace.

Comments: Both John Garang and the ousted Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, later expressed disappointment over the Abuja talks, and said it was largely because GOS was following the doctrinaire policies of the NIF. Garang called it "a failure because of NIF insistence on their federalism, Shari’a, popular congresses".

Sadiq's plan did not get a direct positive response from either side.
 
 

Comments: GOS tried to make preconditions of representn by minor factions - SPLM/A posn paper says confeder'n in interim, then ref'm [BNOSC]

According to President Bashir, the Abuja negotiations were derailed when John Garang was invited to the United States, after which he forbade his delegation to sign the agreement that had been reached.

Comments: The Washington Declaration was of most significance as an indication of the depth of support in the United States for the rebels in Sudan. In countenancing the right of self-determination, it suggested that the US might not oppose eventual separation of the South. This clarified the agenda for the IGADD peace talks beginning the following year. However, as a means of reconciling the Garang and Riek factions it was unfruitful. Some say the follow-up was blocked by secondary commanders within Riek’s faction.
 
 

Comments: Early adjournment of talks was blamed on lack of funds to host the delegations. It might also have been done to avoid an early breakdown. Also, the SPLM/SPLA's National Convention was going on meanwhile (12th March to 12th April) which may have caused overlapping commitments on the part of some negotiators.

Bibliography: Wondu (1995)
 
 

Comments:

References: USIP.4.94
 
 

Facilitators: GOS. The Forum was called by Angelo Beda (Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly) and hosted by Agnes Lokudu (Governor of Bahr el Jebel State)

Agreements: The Forum agreed the "Juba Declaration" which: affirmed unity of Sudan; endorsed GOS policies especially the new federal system; condemned continuation of war by "dissenters" and "foreign conspiracies".

Comments: The Juba Political Forum GOS's "Peace from Within" initiative. It bolstered GOS’s position in the IGADD talks shortly afterwards; indeed appeared to provide an alternative to the IGADD process.

References: "New Horizon" 31.5.94, GOS (1998), Sudanow November 1998
 
 

Date: 17 - 20 May 1994

Convenient Name: IGADD 2

Official Name: 2nd IGADD Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers on the Sudanese Peace Talks

Substance: The GOS submission envisaged a unitary federal Sudan with sharia as a source of law, but with some exemptions for non-Muslims. SPLM/A came on a platform of self-determination and complete rejection of sharia. There was no meeting of minds. The mediators adjourned the talks, issuing a proposed "Declaration of Principles" (DOP) to be considered by the parties before the next meeting. The DOP proposed a secular state with guarantees of equality: if agreement could not be reached on this the DOP envisaged a self-determination for South Sudan, through a referendum.

Comments: The DOP seemed favourable to the SPLM/A. It probably came as a shock to the GOS as it suggested a shift in sympathy away from it by the IGADD countires, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Reference: Wondu (1995)
 
 

Agreements: No progress was made on the question of a secular state, but GOS apparently agreed to the idea of a referendum for the Southern Sudanese to "decide their options without ruling out any option". However, GOS deletes "including independence", and also the idea that the referendum would be "internationally supervised". Meanwhile, the SPLM/A includes "Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills" along with "South Sudan".

Comments: Seeming progress was made through the use of a "non-paper" originally drafted by mediators and then re-drafted by respective delegations. The Non-Paper was a way of making the negotiators engage with the DOP. The GOS, faced with a programme of negotiation which did not favour its views, nevertheless went along with the format. It accepted the principle of a referendum (as it had done in the Frankfurt Declaration) but insisted on practical limitations of its potential to lead to separation.

References: Wondu (1995)
 
 

Comment: It is not clear to us why GOS changed its tactics so abruptly from IGADD 3. Possibly it realised that it could not stop Ethiopia and Eritrea turning against it and therefore that the IGADD forum was too unfavourable.

Convenient name: Asmara Declaration

Official name: Conference of the National Democratic Alliance on Fundamental Issues

Type: Factional dialogue

Participants: DUP, Umma, SCP, USAP (Surur), SPLM/A, Trades Union, Legitimate command, Beja Congress, SAF, Independents

Facilitators Government of Eritrea (host)

Agreements: (After the NIF regime is replaced by the NDA) the general right of self-determination to be exercised in referendums in the South, Nuba Mountains, Ingessena Hills, Abyei. But NDA collectively to strive for reforms to encourage choices for unity.

References: NDA (1995)
 
 

Process: The agenda was open; participants were free to suggest any topic related to the conflict in Sudan.

Agreements: Acceptance of diversity; encourage peace-building projects; condemn intolerance and totalitarianism, continue dialogue especially the Barcelona Process.

Convenient name: Political Charter

Official name:

Type: Factional agreement

Participants: GOS, SSIM/A and other rebel factions but not SPLM/A

Facilitators: GOS

Agreements: After peace and stability in the South, a referendum to be held in the South to determine political aspirations.

References: GOS (1996)
 
 

Facilitators: UNESCO. UNDP, Government of the Netherlands

Background: This meeting followed up the Barcelona Symposium of September 1995. Regarded in UNDP as a setback to the dialogue process, due to disagreements near the end. The next major dialogue was organised by UNDP outside the UNESCO framework (Bad Munstereifel, October 1997).

Agreements: The Final Communiqué affirms: Barcelona dialogue process, IGAD process, international and regional human rights instruments, Geneva Conventions, OLS agreements, support for humanitarian assistance, UNESCO Culture of Peace Framework.

The Draft Final Report contains alternative sets of recommendations (that may not have been finally fully agreed) including: cease-fires and humanitarian corridors, especially to Nuba Mountains, peace zones and safe havens, ban on landmines, mine awareness campaigns, impartial monitoring committee for humanitarian assistance, promotion of indigenous NGOs, return and rehabilitation of the displaced, freedom of association for building civil society, UNESCO to support emergency and peace education, move from emergency assistance towards development, follow-up mechanism under UNESCO.

References: Draft Final Report, Final Communiqué
 
 

Date: April 1997

Convenient name: Khartoum Peace Agreement

Official name: The Sudan Peace Agreement

Type Factional agreement

Participants: GOS, SSIM/A and other rebel factions but not SPLM/A

Facilitators: GOS

Agreements: Broad lines as for Political Charter, but more details about the modalities of implementation including the federal system, the interim period, the Co-ordinating Council of the Southern States.

References: GOS (1997)

Date: To 20^th September 1997

Name: Fashoda Peace Agreement

Type: North-South Factional Talks

Participants: GOS (Riek Machar, Musa El-Mek Kur), SPLM-United (Lam Akol, James Gatduel)

Facilitators: Reth of the Shilluk, Kwongo Dak Padiet

Agreements: Amendments to the Sudan Peace Agreement, guaranteeing the status of SPLM-United and free campaigning before the referendum; and also stipulating conditions for filling the office of the President of the (Southern) Co-ordinating Council and for amending the Constitutional Decree that covered the Khartoum Peace Agreement.

Comments: SPLM-United had become isolated and militarily vulnerable. The agreement enabled Lam Akol to retain a link with his local power base in Tonga area, whilst taking up a post with GOS.

References: Copy of Fashoda Peace Agreement
 
 

Context: Why had GOS agreed to return to negotiation on the basis of the DOP? It had tried but failed to find credible alternative forums, including the possible mediation of Nelson Mandela or Jimmy Carter.
 
 

No agreement on border (SPLA wants to include Abyei, S.Kord and S Blue Nile), legal system [AC.39.10.3, SU.9.9 of 15/5/98]

SPLM/A refuses appeal on humanitarian grounds for a general ceasefire, but agrees to some corridors of tranquillity [Sudanow.6.98]

Context: Khartoum’s new constitution, that retains a pre-eminent place for Sharia but apparently allows the formation of political associations.

Facilitators: Government of Italy (as Chair of IPF), UNDP, Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Facilitators: Kenya (Kenyan Foreign Minister Godana as the Chair), Ethiopia (hosted the meeting in Addis Ababa) Ethiopian Minister Seyoum Mesfin also took part in mediation.

Substance: A major obstacle to agreement seemed to be removed when the SPLM/A Governors of the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills said that the question of self-determination in their areas should not be an obstacle to agreement on self-determination for the South. However, whatever the outcome in the South, they would continue fighting as the SPLM in their own areas.

However, there were still important obstacles before any agreement on self-determination:

References: Reports summarised in Sudan Update, 20 August 1998; Sudanow September 1998
 
 

Comments: The meeting’s statement did not mention self-determination for the South. Although the NDA had agreed this possibility in the 1995 Asmara Declaration, the sectarian Northern parties are very reluctant about it, as is Egypt. The meeting therefore failed to take an opportunity for encouraging Egypt to address the demands for self-determination.

Agreements: Development and peace processes support each other; the international community should prepare for reconstruction phases; peace will require good governance, which involves democracy, participation and international standards of human rights; the series of symposia should continue.

References: Report on symposium.

Date: 14^th January 1999

Convenient Name: USIP New Approach

Official Name: USIP Consultation on Sudan, January 1999

Type: Outsider-Mediated Conference

Paricipants: Members of Sudanese opposition groups, regional governments, research institutions and NGOs and others with links to the US government.

Facilitators: USIP

Substance: The discussion was centred on the effectiveness of the IGAD process and concluded that: it should continue under the leadership of Kenya, should receive more international assistance, and should focus more on the principle of self-determination.

Comment: The meeting was significant as a proxy indicator of US government thinking.

References: USIP (1999)

Date: 8-12 February 1999

Convenient Name: Kampala Declaration

Official Name: Conference on Human Rights in the Transition in Sudan

Type: Outsider-Mediated Conference

Participants: Members of opposition parties, civil groups with opposition sympathies, and a few outsiders

Facilitators: Inter-Africa Group (impetus), Pan African Movement (hosts), Government of Uganda (countenancing of conference)

Recommendations: About 40 separate recommendations covering: accountability for human rights abuses; the Constitution; self-determination; women’s rights; the law and legal structures; freedom of expression; freedom of religion; race relations; disarmament and the rights of former combatants; and human rights during the armed struggle.

Comments: The conference was significant in helping the NDA to work out its position in more detail on issues of human rights and governance. It stimulated the NDA’s writing of its constitution and penal code for Sudan and forced it to consider more closely the need for a referendum law and acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination (not necessarily independence) for marginalised peoples outside the South.

References: Conference on Human Rights in the Transition in Sudan (1999)

Date: March 1999

Convenient name: IPF meeting

Significance: IPF commitment to supporting a revitalised peace process at IGAD and hints of readiness to put pressure on SPLM if no commitment to progress. Unusual consensus between European IPF members, US, Canada etc.