Chronological digest of peace meetings and proposals, 1983-98

Date: 24th March 1986

Convenient name: Koka Dam

Official name: The Koka Dam Declaration

Type: N-S Factional Talks

Participants: SPLM/SPLA (Kerubino Kuanyin, Arok Thon Arok) and National Alliance for National Salvation, NANS, (Awad El Karim Mohamed) representing 14 political parties and 22 trades unions, including Umma, CPS but not the DUP or NIF. Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (host) Agreements: National Constitutional Conference to be held in June, preceded by: recognition by all that the problem is of Sudan not Southern Sudan; lifting of State of Emergency, repeal of "September 1983 Laws" (a version of Shari'a), adoption of constitution based on 1956 Constitution; abrogation of Sudan's military pacts; cease-fire; further discussion on dissolution of government in favour of a new interim government including SPLM/A.

Consequences: A Joint Liaison Committee was set up to pursue the implementation of the agreement. It held meetings in May, June and August but apparently did not survive long after the Sadiq/Garang talks of July.

Date: 31st July 1986

Convenient name: Sadiq/Garang Peace Talks

Official name: Meeting between Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi and Chairman John Garang

Type: Summit talks

Negotiators: GOS (Sadiq al-Mahdi and others), SPLM/A (John Garang and others), Addis Ababa Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (amid hosting OAU meetings)

Agreements: None

Circumstances: The SPLA wanted to take the Koka Dam Declaration as a fixed agreement to be elaborated and implemented, arguing that Sadiq, as head of the Umma Party, was already a signatory. Sadiq argued that Koka Dam was not completely valid: the apparent Umma endorsement lacked true authority; the DUP and NIF were not included; some circumstances had changed. The SPLM/A later claimed that Sadiq had wanted to make a new Umma-SPLM/A agreement (perhaps suggesting that Sadiq wanted to divide the SPLA from the other progressive political forces in NANS or at least to use the peace process to strengthen his own political position in Khartoum) but SPLM/A had refused to do this.

Consequences: Sadiq said that the meeting had revitalised the peace process (suggesting that it would lead to further actions) but was frustrated by the SPLM/A's downing of a civilian airliner near Malakal on 16/8/86. On 21/8/86 Sadiq did announce that the September 1983 laws would be replaced when another set of laws was ready.
 
 

Date: 2nd – 5th December, 1986

Convenient Name: Church-SPLM/A Meeting

Official Name: Meeting Between Sudanese Church Leaders and SPLA/SPLM Leaders

Type: S-S Factional Talks

Participants: SPLM/A (John Garang, Joseph Oduhu and others), Church leaders (Archbishops Paolino Lukudu and Gabriel Zubeir, and Bishop Benjamin Wani, and others) Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (allowing meeting to take place in Addis Ababa). Content: The meeting served to allow the Church leaders to urge the SPLM/A to resume dialogue and conduct the war more humanely. The SPLM/A was able to explain its methods and beliefs more clearly to a constituency that was sympathetic in many ways.

Consequences: The meeting probably led to the Quest for Peace meetings supported by the Sudan Council of Churches the following year.
 
 

Date: January 1987

Convenient Name: NIF Sudan Charter

Official Name: Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity

Type: Policy/proposal document

Participants: National Islamic Front

Content: Sudan is one country. Muslims are the majority. Hence, Islamic jurisprudence shall be the general source of law. Because of regional imbalances and logistical difficulties, a federal system is needed in the constitution. The practice of federalism would have to deepen over time. The federated regions would have more autonomy than the Southern Region did under the Addis Ababa Agreement, but the central government would retain control of national defence and security, the judicial system and general legal codes, and natural resources. The Central Government would have a duty to promote balanced regional development. A broad-based constitutional conference is needed first, but this would go ahead even if the SPLM/A did not choose to attend.

Comment: The policy and actions of GOS since the 1989 coup correspond to the outlines of the NIF Sudan Charter. However, the federal system adopted since 1992 is still far from producing balanced regional development or providing the regions with as much autonomy as the Southern Region enjoyed under the AAA.
 
 

Date: 19th - 24th August,1987

Convenient name: Quest for Peace 1

Official name: The Addis Ababa Peace Forum – Struggle for Peace and Democracy

Type: S-S Factional Talks

Participants: SPLM/A (William Nyuon and others), SAP (Eliaba James Surur and others), Anya Nya 2 Facilitators: Sudan Council of Churches (making contacts and organising) Agreements: Affirm support for Koka Dam, the principle of continuing dialogue, and relief efforts in the South.

Consequences: The meeting was significant in: establishing a principle of solidarity between the SPLM/A and Southerners in GOS areas; keeping alive the Koka Dam agenda; and marking the reconciliation that had taken place between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya 2.
 
 

Date: 7th - 8th September-1987

Convenient name: Quest for Peace 2

Official name: Kampala Quest for Peace

Type: S-S Factional Talks

Participants: SPLM/A (Alfred Ladu Gore and others), SAP (Eliaba James Surur and others).

Facilitators: Government of Uganda (host); probably SCC (making contacts and helping to organise)

Agreements: Applaud the constructive line taken by President Museveni, deplore GOS policy of military confrontation, affirm support for Koka Dam, and the principle of continuing dialogue.

Consequences: The meeting was significant in: confirming the support of the Ugandan President behind the broad stance of the SPLM/A and the Southern opposition in GOS areas.
 
 

Date: 19th - 22nd September-1987

Convenient name: Quest for Peace 3

Official name: Nairobi Search for Peace

Type: S-S Factional Talks

Participants: SPLM/A (Lual [Diing] Wol and others), SAP (Eliaba James Suruur and others).

Facilitators: Government of Kenya (allowing meeting in Kenya); SCC (making contacts and helping to organise)

Agreements: Applaud Kenya’s concern for peace, appeal to international community to put pressure for peace on GOS; appeal for humanitarian relief in the South, and the minimization of hostile attitudes.

Consequences: The meeting was significant in: confirming Kenya’s recognition of the SPLM/A and Southern opinion in Sudan.
 
 

Date: 5th – 8th July, 1988

Convenient name: Quest for Peace 4

Official name: The Addis Ababa Peace Forum

Type: S-S Factional Talks

Participants: SPLM/A (Yousif Kuwa Mekki and others), USAP (Andrew Wieu Riak and others).

Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (allowing meeting in Ethiopia)

Agreements: The National Constitutional Conference to be held before the end of 1988. Appeal for preliminary meeting in the spirit of the 1985 uprising and the Koka Dam Agreement.

Consequences:
 
 

Date: Late 1988

Convenient Name: Prime Minister’s Working Paper for Peace

Official Name: Sudan’s Peace Initiative: A Working Paper for Peace

Type: Policy/proposal paper

Participant: Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi (Speaking for "the government of Sudan with the support of the wide popular base of the Sudanese Political Movement")

Content: Historical account of the background to conflict and peace initiatives; proposal for immediate meeting to discuss cease-fire, humanitarian relief and arrangements for the National Constitutional Conference (but ignoring most of the preconditions agreed at Koka Dam); draft agenda for NCC (leaving out some of the points agreed at Koka Dam, such as "basic human rights" and "natural resources"); outline of transitional arrangements including amnesty and reconstruction.

Comments: The paper’s failure to address the problems remaining from the Koka Dam declaration suggest that its purpose was not as a serious proposal to the SPLM/A. It was probably an attempt to avoid losing the initiative in the face of the (similarly-named) DUP-SPLM/A negotiations (see next entry).
 
 

Date: August 1988 to 14th-November 1988

Convenient name: November Accords

Official name: Sudanese Peace Initiative

Negotiators: SPLM/A (John Garang, Lam Akol and others), DUP (Mohamed Osman El-Mirghani, Sid Ahmed El-Hussein and others)

Facilitators: Government of Egypt (facilitating contacts), Government of Ethiopia (venue for meeting)

Agreements: National Constitutional Conference to be held by 31/12/88, preceded by: freezing of "Hodoud" [Shari’a punishment] provisions in September 1983 laws; abrogation of Sudan's military pacts; lifting of state of emergency; cease-fire; formation of national preparatory committee.

Comments: The substance of the agreement was similar to that of Koka Dam, which DUP had not signed but repudiated. It was presented as a new initiative. From Koka Dam, the SPLM made a concession in not demanding repeal of the September 1983 laws, but only a freezing of the huduud punishments.
 
 

Date: 4/2/89 - 7/2/89

Convenient name: Ambo Workshop (or Koka Dam 2)

Official name: Ambo Workshop on Sudan: Problem and Prospects

Type: Partisan Conference

Participants: A few members of SPLM/A and intellectuals from inside Sudan not representing parties but "the National Democratic Forces"

Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (use of Ethiopia as venue), the proposal for the workshop came from non-sectarian intellectuals in Sudan; the SPLM/A organised it

Agreements: (Unsigned shared diagnosis of Sudan's problems): The principle of citizenship can be the only basis of national identity; Arabic is the shared language; equality for women; an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist foreign policy; a radical abandonment of the capitalist system, by revolutionary means.

Context: Participants from government-held Sudan were detained for questioning by the security services on their return.

Comment: The Ambo Workshop came at a time when a popular movement for peace seemed to be emerging in opposition to the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, following the November Accords. It served to increase the political tension. It may be seen as an attempt to construct a coalition behind a radical socialist – even revolutionary - agenda. Perhaps in retrospect this was tactically naïve. It may have played a part in winning support for the Islamist coup later in the year. The workshop’s final statement is interesting in addressing questions of economic policy which are often glossed over in the mainstream peace process.
 
 

Date: 23-24 February 1989

Convenient name: Bergen Forum

Official name: The Bergen Forum on the Management of Crisis in Sudan

Type: Background dialogue (national)

Participants: Sudanese intellectuals from a wide spread of political viewpoints, including NIF and SPLM/A. Facilitators: University of Bergen Centre for Development Studies Content: Position statements, background papers, and general discussion on the peace process and the structure of the state in Sudan.

Agreements: Food should not be used as a weapon; parties should co-operate with humanitarian efforts; political forces should co-operate for convening the National Constitutional Conference, including the institution of a cease-fire; the Forum should re-convene.

Comments: Apparently the Forum did not re-convene. It contributed some thoughtful analysis and shared understanding to the lively peace process of early 1989.
 
 

Date: 19th – 20th August 1989

Convenient Name: 1989 Addis Talks

Official Name: (GOS has called these talks the National Salvation Revolution Initiative) Type: Summit talks Participants: GOS (Mohammed Al-Amin Khalifa and others), SPLM/A (Lam Akol and others).

Facilitators: Government of Ethiopia (Meeting was held in Ethiopia), Government of Egypt (facilitated the contacts to arrange the meeting)

Agreements: GOS and SPLM/A agreed to maintain direct communications through their respective offices in Addis Ababa, and to allow relief to go ahead through OLS.

Content: GOS proposeed an immediate National Dialogue Conference in Khartoum, attended by representatives of GOS, SPLM/A, as well as other national figures and, possibly, some foreigners. The conference resolutions could be put to a referendum. The SPLM/A delegation felt unable to accept this proposal without more specific agreements about the nature and rules of the conference. Instead it said that the long-proposed National Constitutional Conference should be held after the formation of a new government and army of national unity.

Context: A "National Salvation Revolution" (NSR) government had come to power through a military coup, which appeared timed to put a stop to the accelerating peace process based on the Koka Dam Declaration. On taking power it had offered an amnesty to the rebels, and declared ceasefires.

References: Lam Akol (undated), GOS (1998) p.50

Date: 9th September - 21st October 1989

Convenient name: National Dialogue Conference

Official name: The National Dialogue Conference on the Issues of Peace

Type: Partisan conference

Participants: 77 people selected by GOS including 23 Southerners. Chairman: Mohammed El-Amin Khalifa. Deputy Chairman: Joseph Lagu. Facilitators: GOS

Agreements: Sudan should have a federal system of government (with nine states

that could opt out of legislative provisions of a purely religious character), directly elected president, single chamber legislature elected by proportional representation, freedom of worship, rejection of Koka Dam and November Accords as bases for peace.

Comments: The conference laid the foundation for its "Peace from Within" process of the NSR government. The SPLM/A was apparently invited to attend (see Addis Ababa Talks, above) but did not do so. "Peace from Within" therefore went ahead without engaging the main opposing combatants.

References: Burr and Collins (1995)pp.230-231, GOS (1998) p.50

Date: 21st October 1989

Convenient Name: NDA Charter

Official Name: Charter of the National Democratic Alliance (Sudan)

Type: Alliance manifesto

Participants: Representatives of the Umma, DUP and nine other Sudanese political parties, along with 51 trade unions, and later joined by the SPLM/A

Facilitators: Government of Egypt (in that the NDA began by basing itself in Cairo, which is where the SPLM/A signed the Charter in March 1990)

Agreements: The immediate tasks of opposition to the NSR government including "a general political strike, civil disobedience and well protected popular insurrection"; tasks for a transitional period after overthrowing the government, including guarantees of human rights, repeal of Islamist laws; and the form of a transitional government, combining armed forces, trades unions and political parties.

Comments: Work on contstructing a National Democratic Alliance began before the coup of June 1989; the phrase is mentioned in the SPLM/A’s paper of February 1989, ‘On the New Sudan’. The Ambo workshop, which was held in the same month, described itself as comprised of the "National Democratic Forces".

References: Salah Hassan (1993) for historical background and text of the charter. The Charter is also described in Warburg (1992).
 
 

Date: 30th November – 6th December 1989

Convenient Name: Carter Initiative

Type: High Level National Talks

Participants: GOS (Mohamed El-Amin Khalifa and others), SPLM/A (Lam Akol and

others) Facilitators: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter (arranger of the meeting, and attempted mediator of the talks), Kenya (as the country where the talks took place) Context: Carter had been trying to arrange peace talks between the Ethiopian government and rebels. He may have regarded the Sudan problem as linked, or one that he could tackle at the same time. One reason for his involvement may have been to rescue the OLS humanitarian operation, which GOS had recently announced finished. The six-month ceasefire announced by GOS in July had broken down, and fighting was going on in Sudan during the talks.

Process: Carter held meetings with both sides to agree on the time and venue. The SPLM refused to accept his services as mediator. Most of the talks were chaired in turn by the leaders of the opposing delegations. Carter proposed a particular compromise – GOS to stop the use of Islamic Law in courts until a decision of the Constitutional Conference, if the SPLM/A dropped its insistence that GOS specifically abrogate its military pacts with Egypt and Libya – the GOS delegation said it did not have authority to make such a deal.

Agreements: A possible route to peace would be:
    1. formation of a broad-based national government
    2. holding of Constitutional Conference
    3. national referendum to ratify the resulting constitution
It was also agreed that the report from the National Dialogue Conference would be "one of the bases for the solution of the problems of the Sudan", and that a new constitution should provide for one broad-based national army.

Analysis: The above points of agreement did not mark a big advance, as they left too many questions unanswered to lead to practical action. Carter felt that neither side was sufficiently interested in peace.

References: Carter (1989), Woodward (1994)pp.98-99, Lam Akol (undated)pp.116-119

Date: 22nd August – 23rd September 1990

Convenient Name: Southern Sudan Peace Promotion Committee (SSPPC)

Official Name: The Sub-Committee "For the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act,

1972" and Southern Sudanese Peace Appeal Facilitators: GOS (Particularly the three southern members of the RCC)

Participants: Southerners living in GOS areas

Agreements: The final document, "The Southern Sudanese Peace Appeal" broadly followed the pattern established by the Koka Dam agreement. It said that the war was a national (as opposed to Southern) issue and should be resolved by a National Constitutional Conference made up of representatives from GOS, SPLM/A and other parties. This document seems to imply the unity of Sudan, though the Sub-Committee on a Political System had stated that separation was the only solution. Reference: SSPPC (1990)

22 November 1991: SPLM/A factional cease-fire signed [W&P]

Date: 17 December 1991

Convenient name: Nasir-Torit Reconciliation Phase I

Official name: Nairobi Peace Talks between the Torit and Nasir Factions of the SPLM/A
 
 
Date: 23 - 25 January 1992

Convenient name: Frankfurt Agreement

Official name: -

Date: 12 February - 3 March 1992

Convenient name: Nasir-Torit Reconciliation Phase II

Official name: Nairobi Peace Talks between the Torit and Nasir Factions of the SPLM/A
 
 
Date: 26/5/92 - 4/6/92

Convenient name: Abuja I

Official name: Sudanese Peace Conference, Abuja

Type: High Level National Talks

Negotiators: GOS (M.El-Amin Khalifa, G.Kongor, Dr Hussein Sulayman)

SPLM/A-Torit and SPLM/A-Nasir joint delegation

(William Nyuon, Lam Akol, Elijah Malok)

Facilitators: Government of Nigeria (the process was begun under

President Babangida's presidency of the OAU)

Agreements: Conflict to be resolved by peaceful negotiation; Sudan has diverse populations; work towards interim period with confidence building, devolution of powers, Revenue Allocation Commission, reconstruction and resettlement; Nigeria to arrange another meeting.

Comments: Both John Garang and the ousted Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, later expressed disappointment over the Abuja talks, and said it was largely because GOS was following the doctrinaire policies of the NIF. Garang called it "a failure because of NIF insistence on their federalism, Shari’a, popular congresses".

Bibliography: WAP (text of agreement), BNOSC

Date: 19/6/92

Short name: Abuja SPLM/A reconciliation

Official Name: Agreement on Reconciliation of The Divided SPLM/SPLA

Type: Factional talks

Negotiators: SPLM/A-Torit (William Nyuon), SPLM/A-Nasir (Lam Akol)

Facilitators: People for Peace and other church-related groups in Nairobi

Agreements: Build on Nairobi agreement of 17/12/91; no separate deals with enemy; confront enemy; respect each other; promote family reunification and humanitarianism; uphold right of self-determination; strive for common position on national interim arrangements; monitor this agreement. Comments:

Bibliography: W&P (text of agreement)

August 1992 Ousted Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi puts to both GOS and the SPLM/A a "Blue-Print for a Just Peace in the Sudan". It proposes a seven-point programme, which consists of general affirmations of diversity, democracy, decentralisation, civil and human rights, review of economic and other institutions, and a balanced foreign policy. It suggests that this programme, along with arrangements for a cease-fire and interim period, is discussed and adopted by a National Constitutional Conference. The seven-point programme is then put to a National Plebiscite. Any regions that reject the programme by a two-thirds majority "should in all fairness be granted the right of self-determination". If the programme is accepted by plebiscite, a further plebiscite takes place to determine the degree of regional decentralisation.

Sadiq's plan did not get a direct positive response from either side.
 
 

Date: March 1993

Convenient Name: Nairobi Conference - Kongor Declaration

Date: 17/4/93

Convenient Name: NDA Nairobi Communiqué

Official Name: The National Democratic Alliance(NDA): The Nairobi

Communiqué

Type: Factional talks

Participants: SPLA, Umma Party, DUP, SCP, USAP, Legitimate Command,

independents (second-rank leaders)

Facilitators: ?

Agreements: Interim constitution to incorporate: international and regional human rights instruments; equality of citizens before the law. Comments:

Bibliography: W&P (text of agreement)

Date: April/May 1993

Convenient Name: GOS-SPLM/SPLA-United Nairobi Peace Talks

Official Name: Nairobi Peace Talks

Type: Factional talks

Participants: SPLM/SPLA-United (John Luk and others), GOS (F.A.Abu

Geseisa and others)

Facilitators: Government of Kenya let Nairobi be used for venue

Agreements: (In general terms that during interim period:) South to be a separate entity in a united federal Sudan; powers and wealth to be allocated between the South and the Federal Government; South to participate in national institutions; guarantees of rights; referendum in South. (On Shari’a:) national laws to be "based on general principles common to the States"; States can enact their own "complimentary" legislation. Comments:

Bibliography: W&P (text of agreement)

Date: 26/4/93 - 17/5/93

Convenient Name: Abuja 2

Official Name: Second Abuja Peace Conference

Type: National Talks

Participants: GOS (M.Al-Amin Khalifa and others), SPLM/A-Mainstream

(John Garang)

Facilitators: Government of Nigeria (hosts)

Agreements: (Agreements not signed but described by hosts.) Need for: explicit division of powers between Central and State Governments; fairer representation in Central Government; Cease-fire commission, National Revenue Allocation Commission with Nigeria as Observer.

Comments: GOS tried to make preconditions of representn by minor factions - SPLM/A posn paper says confeder'n in interim, then ref'm [BNOSC]

According to President Bashir, the Abuja negotiations were derailed when John Garang was invited to the United States, after which he forbade his delegation to sign the agreement that had been reached.

Bibliography: W&P (text of communiqué)
 
 

Date: 20/10/93, 22/10/93

Convenient Name: Washington Symposium

Official Name: Sudan Symposium

Type: Background dialogue

Participants: Sudanese intellectuals and others

Facilitators: United States Institute for Peace, and the U.S. House

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa

Date: 22/10/93

Convenient Name: Washington Declaration

Official Name: -

Type: Factional talks

Participants: SPLM/A-Mainstream (John Garang) and SPLM/A-United (Riek Machar)

Facilitators: U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa

Agreements: Right of self-determination for marginalized areas; mutual cease-fire; follow up this reconciliation process within a regional framework; oppose NIF government; facilitate relief work.

Comments: The Washington Declaration was of most significance as an indication of the depth of support in the United States for the rebels in Sudan. In countenancing the right of self-determination, it suggested that the US might not oppose eventual separation of the South. This clarified the agenda for the IGADD peace talks beginning the following year. However, as a means of reconciling the Garang and Riek factions it was unfruitful. Some say the follow-up was blocked by secondary commanders within Riek’s faction.
 
 

Date: 17 - 23 March 1994

Convenient Name: IGADD 1

Official Name: IGADD Peace Talks on the Sudan Conflict

Type: National talks

Participants: SPLM/SPLA (John Garang), SPLM/SPLA-United (Riek

Machar), GOS (Omer Hassan Al-Bashir), IGADD heads of

state/leading ministers

Facilitators: IGADD states, especially Government of Kenya (IGADD

chair) as hosts and mediators.

Agreements: Vague agenda for future talks; principles of neutral humanitarian assistance; recognition of OLS; corridors of tranquillity for 2.5 months for child vaccination.

Comments: Early adjournment of talks was blamed on lack of funds to host the delegations. It might also have been done to avoid an early breakdown. Also, the SPLM/SPLA's National Convention was going on meanwhile (12th March to 12th April) which may have caused overlapping commitments on the part of some negotiators.

Bibliography: Wondu (1995)
 
 

Date: 12/4/94

Convenient Name: Washington Seminar

Official Name:

Type: Background dialogue

Participants: Prominent Sudanese representing a variety of perspectives; U.S. analyst, government officials, humanitarian groups, representatives of states in East Africa and the Horn. Facilitators: United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Recommendations: Standing working group for IGADD peace process; more sustained process; clearer agenda for talks; corridors and zones of tranquillity; research on elements of settlement and arrangements; more unofficial dialogues; conflict resolution efforts to take place at several levels.

Comments:

References: USIP.4.94
 
 

Date: 14 – 16 May 1994

Convenient name: Juba Political Forum

Official name: Juba Political Forum on Peace/Juba Declaration

Type: Factional dialogue

Participants: Southerners and others mobilized by GOS, including Vice President George Kongor, several, Governors of southern States; 20 representatives selected from each of the ten southern States.

Facilitators: GOS. The Forum was called by Angelo Beda (Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly) and hosted by Agnes Lokudu (Governor of Bahr el Jebel State)

Agreements: The Forum agreed the "Juba Declaration" which: affirmed unity of Sudan; endorsed GOS policies especially the new federal system; condemned continuation of war by "dissenters" and "foreign conspiracies".

Comments: The Juba Political Forum GOS's "Peace from Within" initiative. It bolstered GOS’s position in the IGADD talks shortly afterwards; indeed appeared to provide an alternative to the IGADD process.

References: "New Horizon" 31.5.94, GOS (1998), Sudanow November 1998
 
 

Date: 17 - 20 May 1994

Convenient Name: IGADD 2

Official Name: 2nd IGADD Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers on the Sudanese Peace Talks

Type: Summit talks

Participants: SPLM/A (Salva Kiir), GOS

Facilitators: IGADD states, especially GOK. GOK hosts and provides

Minister as chairperson (Mr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka)

Agreements: Strengthened OLS humanitarian agreement along lines agreed at IGADD 1; political talks reached no agreement

Substance: The GOS submission envisaged a unitary federal Sudan with sharia as a source of law, but with some exemptions for non-Muslims. SPLM/A came on a platform of self-determination and complete rejection of sharia. There was no meeting of minds. The mediators adjourned the talks, issuing a proposed "Declaration of Principles" (DOP) to be considered by the parties before the next meeting. The DOP proposed a secular state with guarantees of equality: if agreement could not be reached on this the DOP envisaged a self-determination for South Sudan, through a referendum.

Comments: The DOP seemed favourable to the SPLM/A. It probably came as a shock to the GOS as it suggested a shift in sympathy away from it by the IGADD countires, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Reference: Wondu (1995)
 
 

Date: 19 - 29 July 1994

Convenient name: IGADD 3

Official name: Third Negotiating Session of the Sudan Peace Talks

Type: Summit talks

Participants: GOS (M.El-Amin Khalifa, Ali El-Hag) SPLM/A (Salva Kiir)

Facilitators: IGADD states, especially GOK. GOK hosts and provides Minister as chairperson (Mr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka)

Agreements: No progress was made on the question of a secular state, but GOS apparently agreed to the idea of a referendum for the Southern Sudanese to "decide their options without ruling out any option". However, GOS deletes "including independence", and also the idea that the referendum would be "internationally supervised". Meanwhile, the SPLM/A includes "Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills" along with "South Sudan".

Comments: Seeming progress was made through the use of a "non-paper" originally drafted by mediators and then re-drafted by respective delegations. The Non-Paper was a way of making the negotiators engage with the DOP. The GOS, faced with a programme of negotiation which did not favour its views, nevertheless went along with the format. It accepted the principle of a referendum (as it had done in the Frankfurt Declaration) but insisted on practical limitations of its potential to lead to separation.

References: Wondu (1995)
 
 

The IGADD peace mediators picked up the concept of self-determination. In their 1994 "Declaration of Principles" (DOP) they asserted "the right of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum".
 
 
However, in their 1994 re-drafting of the DOP, the GOS changed the phrase to: "[e]xtensive right of self-administration on the basis of federation to the people of the Sudan".
 
 

Date: 6 September 1994

Convenient name: IGADD 4

Official name:

Type: National talks

Negotiators: GOS (Ghazi Salah El-Din) SPLM/A (Salva Kiir)

Facilitators: IGADD states, especially GOK. GOK hosts and provides

Minister as chairperson (Mr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka)

Agreements: -

Narrative: The GOS delegation leader, Dr Ghazi Salah el-Din, reversing the apparent GOS concession of IGADD 3, completely rejected the idea of self-determination for the South. Talks were adjourned without any contribution from SPLM/A. Dr Ghazi's words about GOS's mission to Islamize Africa were probably interpreted by the mediators as an attempt to derail the whole IGADD process. However, the next IGADD Heads of State summit, on 19 September, resolved to continue with the initiative on the basis of the DOP.

Comment: It is not clear to us why GOS changed its tactics so abruptly from IGADD 3. Possibly it realised that it could not stop Ethiopia and Eritrea turning against it and therefore that the IGADD forum was too unfavourable.

References: Wondu (1995)

12/12/94 SPLM/A-Umma agreement, Chukudum

Jan 1994 SPLM/A signs agreement with DUP and other opposition groups [Wondu(95)]

Lafon Declaration

Date: March 1995

Convenient name: International Campaign Appeal

Official Name: International Campaign for Peace in Sudan

Type: Petition/appeal

Participants: A range of mostly European and North American NGOs

Facilitators: Co-ordinators, Coalition for Peace in the Horn of

Africa - USA, with the help of counterparts in EWOHA

and Horn of Africa Policy Group - CANADA

Agreements: (Call for:) Endorsement of the IGADD Declaration of Principles; Support of Multi-track peace diplomacy at several levels; self-reliance and principles of access and accountability in humanitarian work; exert pressure for peace, justice and human rights Comments:

References: Appeal put out by CPHA
 
 

Date: June 1995

Convenient name: Asmara Declaration

Official name: Conference of the National Democratic Alliance on Fundamental Issues

Type: Factional dialogue

Participants: DUP, Umma, SCP, USAP (Surur), SPLM/A, Trades Union, Legitimate command, Beja Congress, SAF, Independents

Facilitators Government of Eritrea (host)

Agreements: (After the NIF regime is replaced by the NDA) the general right of self-determination to be exercised in referendums in the South, Nuba Mountains, Ingessena Hills, Abyei. But NDA collectively to strive for reforms to encourage choices for unity.

References: NDA (1995)
 
 

Date: 23rd –26th September 1995

Convenient Name: Barcelona Symposium

Type: Academic Dialogue

Participants: GOS (Ghazi Salahuddin and others), SPLM (Pagan Amum and others),

other Sudanese personalities, and international resource people Facilitators: UNESCO, UNDP, Government of Spain, regional government of Catalonia Background: The symposium was initiated under UNESCO’s global "Culture of Peace" programme. It proved to be the first in a series of Academic Dialogue conferences for which UNDP eventually took over the co-ordinating role. The next in the series was the Noordwijk Symposium in May 1996.

Process: The agenda was open; participants were free to suggest any topic related to the conflict in Sudan.

Agreements: Acceptance of diversity; encourage peace-building projects; condemn intolerance and totalitarianism, continue dialogue especially the Barcelona Process.

References: SPLM/SPLA Update Vol.4 No.40 Date: 10 April 1996

Convenient name: Political Charter

Official name:

Type: Factional agreement

Participants: GOS, SSIM/A and other rebel factions but not SPLM/A

Facilitators: GOS

Agreements: After peace and stability in the South, a referendum to be held in the South to determine political aspirations.

References: GOS (1996)
 
 

Date: 20th – 23rd May 1996

Convenient Name: Noordwijk Symposium

Official Name: Symposium on Conflict Resolution: The Humanitarian Dimension – The

Case of the Sudan Type: Academic dialogue Participants: GOS (Dr Ghazi Salahuddin and others), SPLM (Pagan Amum and others), other rebel factions, international resource persons and obervers.

Facilitators: UNESCO. UNDP, Government of the Netherlands

Background: This meeting followed up the Barcelona Symposium of September 1995. Regarded in UNDP as a setback to the dialogue process, due to disagreements near the end. The next major dialogue was organised by UNDP outside the UNESCO framework (Bad Munstereifel, October 1997).

Agreements: The Final Communiqué affirms: Barcelona dialogue process, IGAD process, international and regional human rights instruments, Geneva Conventions, OLS agreements, support for humanitarian assistance, UNESCO Culture of Peace Framework.

The Draft Final Report contains alternative sets of recommendations (that may not have been finally fully agreed) including: cease-fires and humanitarian corridors, especially to Nuba Mountains, peace zones and safe havens, ban on landmines, mine awareness campaigns, impartial monitoring committee for humanitarian assistance, promotion of indigenous NGOs, return and rehabilitation of the displaced, freedom of association for building civil society, UNESCO to support emergency and peace education, move from emergency assistance towards development, follow-up mechanism under UNESCO.

References: Draft Final Report, Final Communiqué
 
 

Date: April 1997

Convenient name: Khartoum Peace Agreement

Official name: The Sudan Peace Agreement

Type Factional agreement

Participants: GOS, SSIM/A and other rebel factions but not SPLM/A

Facilitators: GOS

Agreements: Broad lines as for Political Charter, but more details about the modalities of implementation including the federal system, the interim period, the Co-ordinating Council of the Southern States.

References: GOS (1997)

Date: To 20th September 1997

Name: Fashoda Peace Agreement

Type: North-South Factional Talks

Participants: GOS (Riek Machar, Musa El-Mek Kur), SPLM-United (Lam Akol, James Gatduel)

Facilitators: Reth of the Shilluk, Kwongo Dak Padiet

Agreements: Amendments to the Sudan Peace Agreement, guaranteeing the status of SPLM-United and free campaigning before the referendum; and also stipulating conditions for filling the office of the President of the (Southern) Co-ordinating Council and for amending the Constitutional Decree that covered the Khartoum Peace Agreement.

Comments: SPLM-United had become isolated and militarily vulnerable. The agreement enabled Lam Akol to retain a link with his local power base in Tonga area, whilst taking up a post with GOS.

References: Copy of Fashoda Peace Agreement
 
 

Date: 5th – 9th October 1997

Convenient Name: Bad Munstereifel Symposium

Official Name: Round-Table Meeting on Sound Governance: International Experiences

in Decentralisation and Federal Systems Facilitators: UNDP, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Background: After the disappointing meeting in Noordwijk, UNDP decided to organise

this meeting at Bad Munstereifel, Germany, largely independently of UNESCO and its Culture of Peace programme. Agreements: Systems of decentralisation, though varied, usually involve:

division of powers, democratic participation,

solidarity, sharing of wealth/revenue,

resolution of disputes through higher courts.

Conflicts of interest may be solved through: decentralisation, self-determination, human

rights, democracy.

Constitution-making should involve civil society

organisations, the state and conflicting

parties, and should reflect national consensus

on the basic issues of sound governance.

South Africa may provide a model for reconciliation.

References: SPLM/SPLA Update, Vol.6 No.10

Date: November 1997

Convenient Name: IGAD (5)

The SPLM/A presented a map showing the area requiring the area that it demanded should exercise self-determination. This area not only included the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, but much other territory in Darfur, Kordofan, White Nile and Blue Nile. GOS was ready to discuss a referendum for self-determination, but only for the South (according to 1956 boundaries).

Context: Why had GOS agreed to return to negotiation on the basis of the DOP? It had tried but failed to find credible alternative forums, including the possible mediation of Nelson Mandela or Jimmy Carter.
 
 

Date: 7th-8th April 1998

Convenient Name: Great Lakes Church Councils Meeting

Venue: Nairobi

Facilitators: All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), NSCC

Date: 4th – 6th May 1998

Convenient Name: IGAD 6

Type: National Talks

Participants: GOS, SPLM/A

Facilitators: Kenya (venue, mediation: Foreign Minister Bonaya Godana)

Agreement: The two sides did not change their basic positions from those presented at IGAD 5 in November, though GOS conceded that any referendum on self-determination in the South might be monitored by foreigners.

No agreement on border (SPLA wants to include Abyei, S.Kord and S Blue Nile), legal system [AC.39.10.3, SU.9.9 of 15/5/98]

SPLM/A refuses appeal on humanitarian grounds for a general ceasefire, but agrees to some corridors of tranquillity [Sudanow.6.98]

Context: Khartoum’s new constitution, that retains a pre-eminent place for Sharia but apparently allows the formation of political associations.

Comment: Sadiq al-Mahdi says that a referendum will aggravate the war, unless a climate of confidence is established first. [SU.9.9 citing al-Hayat/AFP 9/5/98]
 
 
Date: 22nd to 24th July 1998

Convenient Name: Citta Di Castello Symposium

Official Name: Symposium on Governance and Constitutional Practice at Citta Di

Castello, Italy Participants: GOS (Ibrahim Abu-Oaf and others), SPLM (Kuol Manyang Juk and others), international observers (IGAD, EU)

Facilitators: Government of Italy (as Chair of IPF), UNDP, Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Process: Introductory talks and plenary discussions were held on a variety of topics under the general heading. Considerable time was spent discussing the role of religion in the state. Agreements: Confirmed principles agreed at Barcelona, Noordwijk and Bad Munstereifel, and agreed on the value of further meetings. References: Final Report of meeting.

Date: 4th – 6th August 1998

Convenient Name: IGAD 7

Type: GOS (Mustafa Osman Ismail, Riek Machar and others), SPLM/A (Salva Kiir and others)

Facilitators: Kenya (Kenyan Foreign Minister Godana as the Chair), Ethiopia (hosted the meeting in Addis Ababa) Ethiopian Minister Seyoum Mesfin also took part in mediation.

Substance: A major obstacle to agreement seemed to be removed when the SPLM/A Governors of the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills said that the question of self-determination in their areas should not be an obstacle to agreement on self-determination for the South. However, whatever the outcome in the South, they would continue fighting as the SPLM in their own areas.

However, there were still important obstacles before any agreement on self-determination:

Context: A personal meeting between Riek Machar and John Garang had taken place in the proceeding months. In its statement at the beginning of the talks, GOS declared a unilateral and comprehensive cease-fire. After the talks, Riek Machar said that the SPLM/A had taken a positive step (apparently referring to its move towards detaching the questions of the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills from the matter of self-determination for the South).

References: Reports summarised in Sudan Update, 20 August 1998; Sudanow September 1998
 
 

Date: 15th – 17th August

Convenient Name: NDA Cairo Meeting

Participants: Most of the major NDA parties and leaders, including Sadiq al-Mahdi

(Umma Party), Osman al-Mirghani (DUP) and John Garang (SPLM/A) Facilitators: Egypt (allowed Cairo to be used as the venue for the meeting)

Agreements:

Matters Discussed: Reports of splits or at least tensions in NDA as between the biggest northern parties (Umma and DUP), whose representatives seemed to favour a compromise solution to take part in a coalition government, and the others who insisted on the armed overthrow of the NIF regime. [AC39.17] Context: The NDA leaders also held a meeting with the Secretary-General of Egypt’s National Democratic Party, a fact that caused an outcry among sympathisers of GOS, that Egypt appeared to be supporting the rebels.

Comments: The meeting’s statement did not mention self-determination for the South. Although the NDA had agreed this possibility in the 1995 Asmara Declaration, the sectarian Northern parties are very reluctant about it, as is Egypt. The meeting therefore failed to take an opportunity for encouraging Egypt to address the demands for self-determination.

References: Africa Confidential Vol.39 No.17, Sudan Update, Vol.9 No.17 citing various news agency reports. Date: September 1998 Convenient Name: NDA Asmara Meeting Significance: Failure of NDA legal secretariat to present dreaft constitution and failure of parties to agree on interim arrangements [A de W].
 
 
Date: 12th to 16th October 1998

Convenient Name: Warsaw Symposium

Official Name: Symposium on Reconstruction and Development in Post-War Sudan

Participants: GOS (Abdel Galil Abdel Gabar and others), SPLM (Pagan Amum Okiech and others), international observers (IGAD, ADB, UNESCO, IMF, World Bank) Facilitators: UNDP, Poland-Africa Foundation Process: Talks comprised seven sessions and topics within the overall subject. A reference document was used: a synthesis of position papers from various parties in Sudan (Scott-Villiers and Dammers, 1997).

Agreements: Development and peace processes support each other; the international community should prepare for reconstruction phases; peace will require good governance, which involves democracy, participation and international standards of human rights; the series of symposia should continue.

References: Report on symposium.

Date: 14th January 1999

Convenient Name: USIP New Approach

Official Name: USIP Consultation on Sudan, January 1999

Type: Outsider-Mediated Conference

Paricipants: Members of Sudanese opposition groups, regional governments, research institutions and NGOs and others with links to the US government.

Facilitators: USIP

Substance: The discussion was centred on the effectiveness of the IGAD process and concluded that: it should continue under the leadership of Kenya, should receive more international assistance, and should focus more on the principle of self-determination.

Comment: The meeting was significant as a proxy indicator of US government thinking.

References: USIP (1999)

Date: 8-12 February 1999

Convenient Name: Kampala Declaration

Official Name: Conference on Human Rights in the Transition in Sudan

Type: Outsider-Mediated Conference

Participants: Members of opposition parties, civil groups with opposition sympathies, and a few outsiders

Facilitators: Inter-Africa Group (impetus), Pan African Movement (hosts), Government of Uganda (countenancing of conference)

Recommendations: About 40 separate recommendations covering: accountability for human rights abuses; the Constitution; self-determination; women’s rights; the law and legal structures; freedom of expression; freedom of religion; race relations; disarmament and the rights of former combatants; and human rights during the armed struggle.

Comments: The conference was significant in helping the NDA to work out its position in more detail on issues of human rights and governance. It stimulated the NDA’s writing of its constitution and penal code for Sudan and forced it to consider more closely the need for a referendum law and acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination (not necessarily independence) for marginalised peoples outside the South.

References: Conference on Human Rights in the Transition in Sudan (1999)

Date: March 1999

Convenient name: IPF meeting

Significance: IPF commitment to supporting a revitalised peace process at IGAD and hints of readiness to put pressure on SPLM if no commitment to progress. Unusual consensus between European IPF members, US, Canada etc.